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LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Jason Mazzone*
Margaret Tarkington’s insightful article, Freedom of Attorney-Client
Association, makes a useful contribution to how we think about constitutional
protections for associations. 1 While the Supreme Court has understood
associations to promote expression and therefore has grounded the doctrine of
associational freedom in the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, 2 Professor
Tarkington rightly recognizes that people associate in order to get things done. In
particular, associating with others is a principal means of pursuing political goals:
through collective appeals to the legislature in order to produce or shape statutory
law; by promoting shared interests within the agencies of the executive branch;
and by banding together to file lawsuits to secure legal rights. Members of
associations often engage in expression, but basing a freedom of association
doctrine on the Speech Clause misses the practical effects of collective
endeavors. Instead, as Professor Tarkington observes, the First Amendment right
“to assemble, and to petition the Government” 3 is the more relevant
constitutional basis for associational freedom.
Professor Tarkington persuasively shows that once associational freedom is
understood in terms of political action, lawyering is an important component of
the right to associate. Lawyers frame issues in terms that resonate with legislators
who write the laws and with the executive officials who implement it. (It is no
accident that many professional lobbyists today are lawyers.) Lawyers, of course,
are also indispensable to successfully pursuing a grievance in the courts. Without
the ability to engage lawyers, many associations would be unable to pursue
successfully their goals.
Professor Tarkington’s analysis of the significance of lawyering to
associational freedom is not historical. She wisely makes no claim that as of 1791
(when the First Amendment was ratified) or 1868 (when the Fourteenth
Amendment applied the First Amendment to the states), the Constitution was
understood to protect lawyering as an aspect of associational freedom. Instead,
Professor Tarkington’s account is sensibly grounded in the modern complexities
of the government and in an understanding of the tools that are needed to access
the levers of power within today’s vast administrative state. As Professor
Tarkington shows, today, without access to lawyers, the benefits of associating
together in pursuit of a common cause will often remain unrealized.

* © 2013 Jason Mazzone, Professor of Law & Lynn H. Murray Faculty Scholar in
Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Email: mazzonej@illinois.edu.
1
Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of Attorney-Client Association, 2012 UTAH L. REV.
1071.
2
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984) (describing freedom of
expressive association). The Court has also recognized a constitutionally protected
freedom of intimate association. Id. at 618–19; see also id. at 631 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (locating the protection as part of the constitutional “zone[] of privacy”).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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While Professor Tarkington succeeds in showing that associational freedom
should reflect the important role played by lawyers, her article is less persuasive
in setting out the precise contours of protection for the attorney-client
relationship that should follow. Professor Tarkington’s account amply supports a
right of a group of citizens banded together to engage counsel to assist them in
pursuing their goals. This is not, however, how Professor Tarkington presents the
relevant interests. Instead, Professor Tarkington casts the right at issue as less
about laypeople accessing lawyers and more about the interests of lawyers
themselves. Thus, she write, “freedom of association secures an attorney’s right
to associate with others for the purpose of providing legal advice.”4 Professor
Tarkington casts associational freedom as the right of the attorney because she
recognizes that, in practice, lawyers do not merely help frame pre-existing
claims. Instead, lawyers inform people about claims they did not previously
recognize or understand. Moreover, as a long history of civil rights test litigation
demonstrates, lawyers are often the ones with the agenda: in order to pursue it in
the courts (and comply with rules of standing) lawyers need first to find clients
with cognizable injuries who can serve as the vehicle for articulating a complaint.
The problem with Professor Tarkington’s approach is that once the interests
of lawyers predominate, it is not obvious that the constitutional right of
association comes into play. For it is one thing in a constitutional republic to
confer protection upon a group of like-minded citizens gathering together in
pursuit of common interests and quite another to protect the activities of a lawyer
seeking a client to serve as the means to the lawyer’s own ends. The latter
scenario, having little to do with exporting Tocquevillian notions of association
to the modern American state, requires a justification for the value of activistlawyers within the constitutional order. That a client needs a lawyer does not
lead to the conclusion that a lawyer needs the client—and that the relationship
merits constitutional protection on this basis. Perhaps there is a relevant
constitutional grounding for lawyer-activism but it is not easily constructed upon
the foundations of associational freedom that have already been established and
upon which Professor Tarkington seeks now to build. Professor Tarkington’s
lawyer-centered approach represents a claim for a new doctrine of associational
freedom rather than a modest extension of existing rules.
As a new account, Professor Tarkington’s approach faces a significant
hurdle. It runs contrary to entrenched norms governing the role that lawyers play
within our modern political and legal system. The legal profession is based on the
idea (whether true in practice or not) that lawyers are mouthpieces for hire. They
defend murderers and child molesters in criminal court, they represent polluters
and discriminators in civil cases, they press for legal reforms that benefit the few
over the many—all with the understanding that in so doing they are acting at the
behest of the client rather than advocating their own causes. Lawyering, we
lawyers tell ourselves and tell the world, is a profession not a cause. In selling her
argument for a constitutional right, Professor Tarkington is in the difficult
position of asking the legal profession to give up the norm of the disinterested
advocate.
4

Tarkington, supra note 1, at 1086.
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A tension internal to Professor Tarkington’s lawyer-based account of
associational freedom bears also noting. Invoking the fate of the Humanitarian
Law Project, which was subjected to a criminal provision of the PATRIOT Act
that barred providing “material support” to groups the government has designated
as terrorist organizations, 5 Professor Tarkington tells courts to resist the
temptation to infer criminal culpability on the part of a lawyer from the lawyer’s
association with an organization that includes culpable members. “If,” Professor
Tarkington writes, “attorneys can . . . be prohibited from associating with those
involved in a political movement merely because a member or faction of that
movement engages in illegal or violent conduct, then access to law or legal
processes for the entire movement may be foreclosed.” 6 In a world in which
lawyers are just mouthpieces for their clients, that argument sounds generally
correct. Yet in Professor Tarkington’s account, recall, the lawyer is actually the
principal player, the client the vehicle. If lawyers are to be understood in the way
that Professor Tarkington presents them—as seeking out, encouraging, and
engaging clients who serve the lawyer’s own agenda—then it is arguably less
objectionable to associate the lawyer also with the client’s proven misdeeds. One
cannot, in other words, have things both ways: “attorney speech and advocacy”
protected by the Constitution on one hand,7 and immunity on the ground that
lawyers do not personally agree with the clients they represent8 on the other.
Professor Tarkington’s achievement is to show that associational freedom
should encompass lawyering. With that, her article should have considerable
impact on academic and judicial accounts of associational rights. In practice,
however, the impact is likely to come in terms of protections for the ability of
organizations to engage counsel—the right to client-attorney association—rather
than, as in her focus, on a right that belongs to and is exercised by attorneys.

5

See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
Tarkington, supra note 1, at 1107.
7
Id. at 1090.
8
See id. at 1115–16.
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